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We propose a vitalist reading of Michel Foucault’s work going beyond the main-
stream interpretation that divides his proposals into three dimensions: knowledge,
power and subjectivation. We will start our interpretation with her last text: “Life:
Experience and Science”. This text contains three important elements. First, it of-
fers a deep reflection about the meaning of ‘life’ in the work of one of Foucault’s
Masters, Georges Canguilhem. Second, it pays tribute to the value of his work in
the transformation of philosophy. Finally, it offers reinterpretation of Foucault’s
own work. We will sustain that the last lesson of Foucault is to propose vitalism
as the key way of thinking for a future philosophy. To put this forward, we should
first direct our attention to the work of Canguilhem, and then we will explain how
the dynamics of knowledge, power and subjectification can be read from a vitalist
approach. 
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El presente artículo propone una lectura vitalista del trabajo de Foucault, la cual
conjuga las tres dimensiones tradicionales con que se suele aprehender su trabajo:
saber, poder y subjetivación. Nuestra interpretación comienza por su último texto:
“La vida: la experiencia y la ciencia”. En este, podemos encontrar tres importantes
elementos. Primero: ofrece una reflexión sobre la “vida” en la obra de Canguilhem.
Segundo: se rinde tributo a la importancia que tuvo su trabajo en la transforma-
ción de la filosofía. Por último, el texto aporta una reinterpretación del propio tra-
bajo de Foucault. De este modo, sostendremos que la última lección de Foucault es
proponer un enfoque vitalista como desafío para la filosofía del futuro. Para expo-
ner  esto,  comenzaremos  por  dirigir  nuestra  atención  sobre  el  trabajo  de Can-
guilhem. Una vez hecho esto, explicaremos cómo las dinámicas de saber, poder y
subjetivación pueden ser leídas desde un enfoque vitalista. 
Maureira Velásquez, Marco & Tirado Serrano, Francisco (2019). The last lesson of Michel Foucault: a vitalism for a
future philosophy. Athenea Digital, 19(2), e2207. https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/athenea.2207
As living beings, we are the effect of the very laws of the multiplication of life.
Georges Canguilhem (1966/1991, p. 278)
Introduction
Gilles Deleuze (1986/1988) established the canonical and most relevant interpretation
of Michel Foucault’s work. The first put forward that the second articulated his reflec-
tions  around  three  central  concepts:  knowledge,  power  and  subject.  Nevertheless,
Deleuze (2013, 2014, 2015), in his courses on Foucault, opened a new surprising read-
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ing. He vindicated the existence of a secret vitalism as a common denominator in Fou-
cault’s proposals: ‘There is in Foucault a kind of vitalism, and we will see that it is re -
ally strange. Where does this vitalism come from?’ (Deleuze, 2014, p. 285).
In this text we cover this statement and we propose a vitalist reading of Michel
Foucault’s work going beyond the mainstream interpretation that divides his work
into three questions: one about knowledge, the second about power and a final one
about subjectivation (Veyne, 2008/2010). We will start our interpretation with the cul-
minating point of Foucault’s work, that is, his text published just before his death:
Life: Experience and Science (Foucault, 1985, in Rabinow and Rose, 2003). This text con-
tains three important elements. First, it offers a deep reflection about the meaning of
‘life’ in the work of one of Foucault’s Masters, Georgue Canguilhem. Second, it pays
tribute to the value of his work in the transformation of philosophy. Finally, it opens
some essential key points not only on the intellectual implications of life science based
on scientific epistemology offered to the debate between two irreconcilable traditions
(on the one hand, the philosophy of experience, sense and the subject, embodied in the
figures of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and, on the other hand, the philosophy of knowl-
edge, rationality and the concept, best represented by Cavaillès, Bachelard, Koyré and
Canguilhem himself), but also, and more importantly, to the reinterpretation of Fou-
cault’s own work.
‘Life’ is a relevant topic in our present. The interest in biosecurity, biosafety, bioe-
conomy, bioengineering, and bioterrorism, by disciplines so diverse as medicine, econ-
omy or ecology speaks volumes about this (Dobson, Barker and Taylor, 2013). In this
vein, it is possible to say that in Sociology and Philosophy vitalism has been one of the
main interests in the last decade (Caygill, 2007; Fraser, Kember and Lury, 2006; Laz-
zarato, 2014/2015; Mullarkey, 2007; Olma and Koukouzelis, 2007; Parisi, 2007). The de-
bates about ‘The posthuman’ (Cecchetto, 2013; Gray, 2001; Haney, 2006; Hayles, 1999)
and the ‘new materialism’ (Barrett and Bolt, 2012; Coole and Frost, 2010; Crockett and
Robbins, 2012; Lemke, 2014; Pfeifer, 2015) are directly linked with the discussion about
vitalism and with the urgent process of reconceptualisation of living. To cite two sim-
ple examples, Rosi Braidotti (2006, 2014) is an author that vindicates a posthuman con-
dition based on a new conceptualization of living matter, and Karen Barad (2007, 2008)
puts forward the notion of agential realism as a way of articulating vitalism and mate -
rialism. Our vitalist reading of Michel Foucault connects with this general interest and
it has the novelty of offering an interpretation from the point of view of life, a topic
underpinning the proposals of one of the most quoted authors in the mentioned litera-
ture.
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Foucault scarcely wrote about vitalism. It is possible to find a quote in The Order
of Things (Foucault, 1966/1994) and in The Birth of Clinic (1963/1994). But he never put
forward explicitly a definition or conception referring this idea. Nevertheless, he men-
tioned profusely the word life through all his books (Foucault, 1963/1994, 1966/1994,
1975/1995, 2010…), and as we argue in the next sessions a question about this notion is
present in all the stages of his work. What is life for Foucault? He reminds us that life
is that which is capable of erring, with the shortcoming being the essential eventuality
that passes through its biology and evolution from start to finish. In this sense, Can-
guilhem declared in his  Writings on medicine “Strictly speaking, nothing living has
been completed” (Canguilhem, 2002/2012, p. 46), and it is in this erring and making
mistakes, where Foucault visualizes the essential externality of life that leads him to
put forward this unique and hereditary error that results in man being a dislocated
and misplaced being. ‘And if we admit that the concept is the response that life is ran-
dom, we should then agree that error is the basis of all human thought and history’
(Canguilhem, 2002/2012, pp. 55-56).
Thus, life is that which is capable of erring and this is the basis and the condition
allowing for all thought. Additionally, by declaring that the concept is the response to
the fact that life is random, normativity, both social and individual, is conceived as the
tool to create the manner in which life relates to its surroundings, with itself and with
the contingency. In other words, through life, a bridge spans, at least potentially, the
gap between a philosophy of experience and the subject which gravitates around ra-
tionality and concept. Seen in this light, the three moments of Foucault’s work that so
clearly describe and analyse Gilles Deleuze (1986/1988) take on another nuance and
prominence. They are not merely three instances-plateaus that, while interconnected,
possess a sort of autonomy and criteria of differentiation. What this philosophy of life
does, rather, is to create the central coordinate of problematisation underlying Fou-
cault’s  thinking;  the  alternative  being  situated  beyond  the  structuralism  and  the
hermeneutics visualised by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1982).
As posed by Georges Canguilhem (1966/1991), to live is to enter in the vital nor-
mativity in response to the anomaly in a kind of unformed language that is character-
istic  of  life.  But,  what  are  its  characteristics?  Specifically,  how is  the  clarification
process regarding the knowledge of life and its integral concepts produced? To answer
this question, we should first direct our attention to the work of Canguilhem, to later
analyse in the notions of knowledge, power and subjectivity our hypothesis: namely,
that the vitality underlies as the main leitmotif and source of creation for Michel Fou-
cault’s thinking.
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The legacy of Georges Canguilhem
In his prologue to The normal and the pathological, Dominique Lecourt (1971, p. XXIX),
criticised Canguilhem’s position regarding information and communication as being
biologically inherited, in that this ‘meant admitting that the individual has a logos that
is inscribed, maintained and transferred (…) defining life as a sense that is inscribed
within the matter, thus admitting to the existence of an a priori objective, of a material
a priori and not only a formal one’1. What Lecourt failed to understand is the fact that
this type of unformed language that is characteristic of life, to which we previously re-
ferred, is not related to DNA sequencing as the writer suggested. What it actually ref-
erences is the idea of biological normativity. Canguilhem himself clarified this:
We may qualify types and functions as normal, because we refer to the dy-
namic polarity of life. If there are biological norms, it is because life, instead
of  being submissive to the environment,  is  an institution of  its  own sur-
roundings and therefore, value is placed not only on the environment but
also on the very organism itself. This is referred to as biological normativity
(Canguilhem, 1966/1991, p. 175)
As Foucault  (1985/2003) stressed, while phenomenology asked ‘experience’ for
the original meaning of every act of knowledge, what we have before us is an invest -
ment that seeks and examines relationships in ‘the living’;  aiming to discover that
which, through this knowledge, corresponds to the concept in life. 
That is, of the concept insofar as it is one of the modes of that information
which every living being takes  from its  environment  and by which con-
versely it structures its environment (…) Forming concepts is a way of living
and not a way of killing life; it is a way to live in a relative mobility and not a
way to immobilize life (Foucault 1985/2003, p. 475).
Or rather, as Guillaume Le Blanc (2004) suggested, they are the two basic ele-
ments that describe the status of the philosophical experience: a) a philosophical anal-
ysis of life cannot be made if it is not based on the normativity concept; and b) the
normativity concept inevitably invokes the idea of life. That is, a sort of auto-produc-
tive recursiveness of the living that resembles a formulation that, from a neurobiologi-
cal perspective, declares that the basic characteristic of life is to establish a particular
type  of  organisation,  to  know,  an  autopoietic organisation  (Maturana  and  Varela,
1985/1994; Varela, 2000). In other words, the limit plays a much greater and more di-
verse role than that of merely serving as a line of spatial demarcation, since, opera-
tionally speaking, this limit forms a part of the interior in the same way that the inter-
1 In this fragment, and in the following ones, the italics are from the original text.
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nal relations make up a part of the production network that allows for the emergence
of the membrane.
It is clear however, that Canguilhem’s philosophy of life, on its own, falls short of
being a  second rate cybernetic perspective, but the recursiveness and self-generative
nature of the living constitutes a significant meeting point. According to Canguilhem
(2002/2012, p. 58) ‘this body is, for a time, given and produced. Its health is, simultane-
ously, a state and an order’. In this vein, it is no coincidence that Pierre Macherey
(2011) declared that Foucault and Canguilhem were the two principal intellectual pil-
lars with regards to thinking about the immanence and power of 20 th century norma-
tivity. Furthermore, as Le Blanc (2004) reminds us: life is value, and values predate hu-
man beings  without  being,  however,  transcendent.  Therefore,  the  pre-existence  of
these values means that life is value and power, a force field in which self-organisation
is continually produced and reproduced.
In this sense, Canguilhem (1966/1991) explicitly considered that human beings, in
a more or less lucid manner, extend a spontaneous effort, characteristic of life, in order
to fight against anything presenting an obstacle to its continuation and development,
considered norms. It is in this frequency where we should calibrate Leriche’s well-
known statement that was so often repeated by Canguilhem: health is life lived in the
silence of the organs. Thus, as a counterpart and enabler of this silence, the body’s con-
sciousness is produced in the feeling of the limits, of the threats, in which the experi-
enced notion of normality depends on the possibility of the infringements of the rules:
‘life is not indifferent to the conditions in which it is possible, that life is polarity and
therefore, the unconscious position of value, in summary: that life is an act of norma-
tive activity’ (Canguilhem, 1966/1991, p. 92).
Therefore, pathological disturbance does not exist alone, and the abnormal may
only be appreciated within a relationship. Because —and this is of utmost importance
— the guiding principles of this philosophy of life that we have attempted to define, do
not arise from the abstract exercising of pure reason, but from a rigorous historical
study of the epistemology of the life sciences. The medical arts (that is, clinical prac-
tice) are the other pillars of this approach, since, according to Canguilhem, ‘the human
technique prolongs vital impulses whose service aims to place a systematic knowledge
that frees them from the numerous and costly trials and errors of life’ (Canguilhem,
1966/1991, p. 97). As we will argue, the mentioned Canguilhem’s proposals expand
and spread with Foucault through a variety of subjects. From the common port of psy-
chiatry and medicine, a trajectory is initiated in which the idea of creation/transgres-
sion of the limit plays a determining role conforming the main legacy of Michel Fou-
cault: the notions of knowledge, power and subjetivation.
5
The last lesson of Michel Foucault: a vitalism for a future philosophy
Knowledge: beyond the autonomy of discourse
Without a doubt, one of the most lucid and influential analyses made in regards to the
thoughts of Michel Foucault was made by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1982). In
it, the authors considered that his philosophical proposal offered an alternative that
transcends hermeneutics and structuralism in that it completely eliminates the notions
of meaning, substituting them with a formal model of human behaviour that is gov-
erned by self-regulated transformations of elements; the phenomenological project of
tracking  all  meaning  behind  the  productive  activity  of  transcendent  subjects  is
avoided; furthermore, it eliminates the need to re-read the social meaning of the prac-
tices that reveal a mysterious hidden meaning. However, the authors claim that in its
archaeological onset, Foucault’s project made a strong effort to demonstrate that the
human sciences may be analysed as if they had autonomy and an internal self-regula-
tion in a kind of proposal in which all that is stated should be considered as the object
of discourse. That is, the illusion of an autonomous discourse underlies this initial pe-
riod of intellectual production.
Nevertheless, the illusion of the autonomous discourse disappears when consider-
ing the manner of thinking/approaching that we described in the previous section.
What we may see, from this perspective, would be the display of a historical prob-
lematisation of the emergence of insanity and medicine (firstly) as a strategy of ap-
proaching the limit and from the limit, in a clear desire to explore the possibilities of
exposure and transgression. In other words: a zoom is carried out on the moving edges
and borders of the coordinates of the recursive and self-generating force field that
makes up a type of vitalist thought. These borders are permeable and diffuse from a
determined system in which it is defined in terms of power (insanity, the clinical, the
literary experience, the emergence of the modern human sciences and the semi-tran-
scendentals of life, work and language).
In this respect, it is necessary to mention  Julián  Sauquillo (1989) who discussed
the great passion for the limits, for an excess of the rational, by which Foucault con-
ceptualised insanity as the creative process of learning; Jean Lacroix (1968) who, in
Histoire de la folie claimed that the true dimension of insanity was not so much being
the object of knowledge but rather, a means of knowing; and Maurice Blanchot (1992)
who mentioned that the said text was not so much a history of insanity but the outline
of a history of limits, of some dark gestures that are rejected by a culture as pure exte -
riority. Alternatively, we can refer to Foucault (1964/1988) himself who affirmed that
the history of insanity would be the history of the Other, which, for a culture, is simul-
taneously internal and foreign and should therefore, be excluded. So, the abnormal is
that which arouses a theoretical interest in the normal. Rules are only recognised as
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such in the infringements. Functions are only revealed based on their flaws. Life only
reaches levels of consciousness and science on its own, when there is an inability to
adapt,  failure  and pain.  Thus,  the  study and analysis  of  this  border  of  exteriority,
which is also the determinant for deployment from the system’s interiority, is clearly a
fundamental issue in Foucault. In fact, knowledge appears as the result or the deriva-
tion of life breaking limits.
In this sense, another fundamental milestone of this period is the direct and ex-
plicit appearance of ‘life’ in semi-transcendental terms (together with work and lan-
guage)  through  which  humans  are  represented  as  finite  beings.  As  Foucault
(1966/1994) reminds us in The Order of Things, modern culture may consider man be-
cause they think about the finite based on man himself, while prior to the 18 th century,
neither the idea of man nor the power of life existed. Moreover, the change that oc-
curred in natural history (the change in focus with respect to zoological collections
and botanical gardens, for example), is not led by a desire to know, but by a new man-
ner of connecting things, through both sight and discourse. One apparent externality
of  this  rupture  is  related  to  the  ever-greater  influence  of  death.  As  Canguilhem
(2002/2012,  p.  47)  masterfully  summarised,  ‘illnesses  are  the  instruments  of  life
through which the living,  men,  are  obligated to confess  their  mortality’,  and only
through this mutation in biology, the sciences and medical practices does it become a
principal and essential element. Thus, it is no coincidence that this author wished ‘to
end these new reflections on the normal and the pathological, outlining a paradoxical
pathology of the normal man, demonstrating that the consciousness of biological nor-
mality considers the relationship with illness, the illness recourse, as the final linchpin
recognised and therefore demanded by this consciousness’ (Canguilhem, 2002/2012, p.
231). In other words, the creation of a limit through which man is created and individ-
ualised in terms of being a living being that participates in life.
Meanwhile, some may argue—even while provisionally accepting our reading hy-
pothesis in general terms—that the previous statements continue to indicate an illu-
sion of autonomous discourse. Thus, three elements should be noted. First, that the
pre-eminent and prominent role of a determined topic does not imply the oblivion
and/or downfall of that which is seemingly its opposite. For example, consider that
History of Madness would be unreadable and inarticulate without the unveiling of the
social practices that historically led to the peripheral confinement of the madness; that
The Birth of the Clinic would not be readable without the analysis of clinical practice
subsequent to the Revolution; that similarly, in The Order of Things, the emergence of
the semi-transcendentals of life, work and language would not have been deployed
without reference to the concrete practices influencing the mutation/rupture of natu-
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ral history in biology, of the study of the wealth in political economics, and of general
grammar in philology. Second, we should stress the importance of the call to empha-
sise the issue as an interaction between the border and the interior, between the nor-
mal and the pathological in a recursive derivation of self-production. Finally, while
Foucault (1966/1994, p.  8) claims that ‘language loses its place of privilege and be-
comes, in turn, a historical figure that is coherent with the density of its past’, it must
be  recognised  however,  that  this  is  based  on  the  fundamental  dimension  through
which the borders are infringed, widening the ‘thinkable’ margins (which, while im-
plying a trend and a position, is not clearly comparable to the claim of discursive au-
tonomy as an illusion).
Perhaps, this belief of Foucault may be seen more clearly in his conception of
modern literature in regards to the experience of limits that extend beyond dialectic
thought, as well as in his view of language as a basic form of the management of expe-
rience and the creation of subjectivity which, when taken to the extreme, to its ulti-
mate consequences, allows us to reach the non-existent site of the unthinkable, to the
amorphous and elusive region of heterotopia. Clearly, the similarities with respect to
the thoughts of Martin Heidegger (1954/2013) and his conception of art and poetry are
quite  telling  and  substantial.  However,  pluralism is  one  of  the  areas  of  greatness
within Foucault’s lines of thought, his perspectivism that caused him to continually
reposition and re-consider the topics and his own position regarding them. Therefore,
the genealogical twist may be viewed as a change in emphasis for the perspective that,
this time, no longer appears on the borders and the edges but rather, in the interior of
the truth-producing relationships.
Power: on this side of the limit as a subversion strategy
Gilles Deleuze (1986/1988) welcomed this new era of Foucault thought with great en-
thusiasm since, in it, he glimpsed the reinforcement and consolidation of a political
philosophy project that had been beginning to blossom in the previous archaeological
model. Not to disagree, we add that from our point of view, a more powerful (yet
silent) effect of political commitment was deployed upon recalibrating the perspective
inwards, towards the microphysics of power that extend to all segments of the popula-
tion.  This issue of power,  not absent,  had previously been restricted and linked to
highly targeted participation spaces. On the one hand, there were the excluded groups
(the homeless,  insane, lepers,  etc.)  and,  on the other hand,  the transgressor artists
who, for the most part, belonged to an elite population which was influential in its
form and range of action. Thus, the possibilities of subversion were no longer the ex-
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clusive property of figures such as Bataille, Artaud, Hölderlin or Blanchot, but were, at
least to some degree, in reach of the entire population.
Having mentioned this, we shall now return to the central and problematic issue,
not only essential to the analytical project of Foucault and Canguilhem, but also to the
emergence of all Western thought: the link/connection of the  micro (individual, sub-
ject, biological rule) to the macro (society, culture, social rule). Canguilhem’s attitude
with respect to this is somewhat wavering and ambiguous: at times he seems to be-
lieve that it deals with two immeasurable dimensions while at other times, he reveals
a clear enthusiasm for it, taking the form of a vitalism that transcends and is inherent
at both levels.
The social organisation phenomena are like a mimicking of vital organisation
in the same way that Aristotle claims that art imitates nature. Here, imitation
does not mean copying, but rather, a trend to rediscover the sense of a pro-
duction. (Canguilhem, 1966/1991, p. 200)
And, at this point, it goes without saying that said production sense is the recur-
sive and self-production dynamic of oneself that simmers like some inarticulate lan-
guage that is pre-existing without being transcendent. Yet, as we mentioned previ-
ously, Canguilhem also believed that the human technique  prolonged vital impulses,
claiming that the value of Leriche’s teachings lies in the ‘fact that it is a theory of a
technique, a theory for which the technique exists not as a meek servant taking intan-
gible orders but as an advisor and cheerleader, attracting attention to concrete prob-
lems and guiding the research’ (Canguilhem, 1966/1991, p. 71). Not to be satisfied with
this, Canguilhem later underscored the fact that ‘all human technique, including that
of life is registered in life, that is, in an activity of information and assimilation of the
material. The vital technique is not considered a rule, as compared to the human tech-
nique, which would indeed be considered as such. To the contrary: because life is an
activity of information and assimilation it constitutes the basis of all technical activity ’
(Canguilhem, 1966/1991, p. 95, that in italics is ours).
These statements are deeply related with Heidegger’s proposals (1954/2013) and
his question regarding technique. ‘Technique is not, therefore, a pure medium, tech-
nique is a manner of coming out of the hidden’ (Heidegger, 1954/2013, p. 15), which, in
ancient Greece,  not  only referred to doing and knowing how to do like a general
worker, but also referred to art in the general sense of the word, to poiesis (in regards
to ‘understanding’ since knowing means coming out of the darkness). ‘Therefore it
isn’t merely an act of man or a simple means within the limits of this act’, Heidegger
states, ‘it does not occur only within man or in a manner that is determined by him’
(Heidegger, 1954/2013, p. 25). Thus, technique came later in terms of historical obser-
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vation but in the actual historical acts, it occurred earlier. According to Canguilhem,
this is the equivalent to claiming that the abnormal, logically secondary, is first, existen-
tially speaking.  However, technical domain in modern day society, according to Hei-
degger’s celebrated statement, condemned the oblivion of the self. In light of this, Fou-
cault (1981/2005) suggests that, instead of focusing on how the western tekhne sealed
off the oblivion of the self, the equation should be flipped, and we should ask: based on
what tekhnai was the western subject formed? And, where did the games of truth and
error, freedom and constraint that characterise these subjects initiate?
However, the question about subjectivation does not appear until power is deeply
analysed (in fact, the previous quotation is taken from Foucault’s instructions in the
Collège de France from 1981–1982). Thus, in this era, the focus was placed on the study
of technique, from technique and towards technique (penal, governmental, biopoliti-
cal). A technical domain of devices in which institutions are understood as constrict-
ing entities that, nevertheless, are the primary producers/creators of truth; in which
power is not so much a property as it is a strategy, and its effects may not be attrib-
uted to an appropriation, but to provisions, techniques, tactics and functions; in which
it acts more than it possesses, not being an acquired or maintained privilege of the
dominant class, but rather, the collective effect of its strategic positions.
In this context, Gilles Deleuze (1986/1988) proposed the idea of the diagram in or-
der to understand the Foucault approach to power. A diagram is the display of the
power relationships that make up power, and these power relationships are located
not above, but within the very fabric of the agencies that are created. In a way, like
Deleuze, we can say that the diagrams communicate above, below and in between the
respective layers; they are forces in a constant state of change that underlie history.
This means that the diagram, in so far as it exposes a set of relations between
forces, is not a place but rather 'a non-place': it is the place only of mutation
(…) through which forces pursue their mutant emergence. This is why the di-
agram always represents the outside of the strata (…) But the outside con-
cerns force: force is always in relation with other forces, forces necessarily
refer to an irreducible outside. (Deleuze, 1986/1988, pp. 85-86)
Nevertheless, one aspect remains unsolved in this definition: how can we concep-
tualise the mentioned outside? From our point of view, this indomitable outside is the
inarticulate language of life that is, simultaneously, the symphony that decays its inte-
rior. His beliefs regarding the outside, affirming that we are in the presence of a sort of
‘diagram-life’, in which the abstract machinery that Deleuze spoke of, would play the
same role in the autopoietic organisation of the living as procurement does in the par-
ticular structural material.
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However, all that has been previously described inevitably leads us to conclude
that theorisations on biopolitics and biopower (the second explicit and direct emer-
gency of Foucault in regards to life),  is not,  under any circumstances,  and as spe-
cialised critics have naively asserted, the peak point in which the issue of life arises in
Foucault’s works. They clearly play a major role (particularly in the transition towards
the issue of the subject, sexuality, and techniques of the same), but in some way, they
are the priority axis and are more elaborated in this area, in the same way that the
techniques of governing and managing life are precisely that: ‘techniques’ that, in the
sense that we have alluded to, are subsidiaries of a logic that immanently characterises
life and that also constitutes only a defined segment of a vitalist thought /diagram
having a much greater scope.
It is possible to situate the studies of contemporary governmentality and biopoli-
tics, both Anglo-Saxon (Nikolas Rose, 2007, would be the main example) and continen-
tal (Hard and Negri, 2000/2002, or Agamben, 1995/1998, would be the principal expo-
nents) in these misaligned coordinates. An interesting example, in this sense, is the
work of Roberto Espósito (2004/2008), who, in an interesting book on biopolitics and
philosophy, criticised Foucault for never responding (or having done so in an ambigu-
ous manner) to the question of why the politics of life is always threatened with be-
coming a death act. In this regard, Espósito emphasises that ‘the opposing interpreta-
tions of biopolitics that currently confront each other—one being radically negative
and the other, being almost euphoric—only serve to absolutise, increasing the divide
between them’ due to the presence of an ‘epistemological uncertainty attributable to a
lack  of  a  more  ductile  paradigm’  (Espósito,  2004/2008,  pp.  16-17),  that  the  author
points out using the logic of immunisation. It is an interesting bet, neither original nor
useful when considering the teachings of Canguilhem—‘illness is the risk of the living
as such’ (Canguilhem, 1998, p. 35)— and a less blurred view with respect to the collec -
tive works of Foucault. It is precisely with this impulse and understanding spirit that
we shall now consider as emergent property of the living.
Subjectivation: experience, truth and creation
In his course about Foucault, Deleuze insists that this had a real necessity to go be-
yond the notion of power. He felt that his analysis led to a cul-de-sac in that power
was ontologized and became the beginning and end of any kind of explanation about
institutions and social reality. Breaking this limit would mean discovering the ancient
practices of Greeks, a society of free agents responsible for understanding how power
can be a strength fold over the individual. The result of this operation of folding would
be  understood  as  subjectivation.  ‘The  inside  is  always  the  inside  of  the  outside’
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Deleuze (2015, p. 24). And this is, in Deleuzian terms, the main topic of the last books
of Foucault.
Nevertheless, if we read with attention the books dedicated by Foucault to the
History of Sexuality (1976/1988, 1984/1990a, 1984/1990b) we don’t find any definition
of subjectivation as a kind of fold, as the constitution of an inside from the strengths
of the outside. In that sense, the quotes mentioned by Deleuze in order to justify his
affirmation about subjectivation come from texts corresponding to the first stage of
Foucault’s work, we mean Madness and Civilization or The Order of the Things. Attend-
ing to the specific definitions of Foucault about subjectivation, we find three vindica-
tions: a) the experience as a way in which the subject recognises himself as subject, b)
the relations that can be established with truth (understanding this as what can be
thought and how to think in an historical moment), c) creation as the possibility of
thinking of a different way in order to govern ourselves. In short, we don’t find in
Foucault’s latest works a question about how to go beyond the limits of power, instead
there is an articulation of three topics: experience, truth and creation. That is, the rele-
vance of ancient Greek in Foucault is not due to its finding of how to work with
strengths, but its interest in creating a society in that self-government is understood as
a political, aesthetical and moral imperative combining experience and truths. So, Fou-
cault’s proposal is the creation of moral personal limits given that a universal moral
law is unthinkable. In this context, the last text prepared by Foucault and mentioned
at the beginning of this paper, acquires its complete sense: life is a matter of experi-
ence and truth. Both are relevant and its combinations show the contours of our lives.
The text points out to a particular vitalism with two objectives. First, it is a sort of
mediator between a philosophical tradition concerned for the production of truth and
a philosophy focused on experience, contingency and novelty. Second, it is a common
denominator in his concerns about knowledge, power and subjectivation. So Foucault,
ensured that, in some way, his works are not only about knowledge or power but also,
about the subject and life. Furthermore, this concern may be found even in his initial
writings.  An example of  this  is  seen in the 1954 introduction written by Foucault
(1994/1999) for Le rêve et l'existence by Ludwig Binswanger, in which we can clearly
see  his sympathy for  the hermeneutic-ontological  tradition deployed in  Being and
Time by Heidegger.
However, unlike Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), we do not consider that the so-
called genealogical twist of Foucault implies a break with said tradition/problematisa-
tion through a rapprochement to Nietzsche. Rather, what we have (as attested in this
later section) is a series of changes of perspectives over a long philosophical trajectory
that,  nevertheless,  maintained  axial  concerns  (with  a  transversal  influence  of  the
12
Marco Maureira Velásquez; Francisco Tirado Serrano
thinking of Heidegger, Nietzsche and Canguilhem) allowing for the creation of a col-
lective reading such as that proposed by this work.
In the genealogical era, for example, if direct and explicit concern existed regard-
ing conceiving the truth as a privileged object of political appropriation subject to pro-
duction rules and games, in this new period, said insistence exists as a stage on which
the show is folded and unfolded (this time in the form of subjectivity), only having an
emphasis that is more directed towards sexuality and the so-called ‘own techniques’.
In other words, and returning to the teachings of Canguilhem, we may say that a
framework is created in which the issue of normativity is presented in the forefront.
According to Le Blanc (2004), given that life is defined by its diverse forms of individu-
alisation, it is impossible to exclude individuality when trying to understand what ex-
actly life is.
The concept of normativity gives an account of the necessary relationship be-
tween life and individuality. Normativity is the tool through which the indi-
vidual, human or animal, is individualised. After this point, the living being
was no longer considered as a mechanism; it was considered to be a power.
(Le Blanc, 2004, p. 46)
Considering the being as a potentiality under the auspices of the rule; herein lies
the greatness of this philosophical proposal.
Furthermore, when we state, along with Canguilhem, that the human being pro-
longs the spontaneous effort characterising life by fighting against that which opposes
its continuance and development, considered to be rules, we are alluding to this con-
tingency in terms of determination/opportunity. As Le Blanc (2004, p. 86) pointed out,
in this way, there is a correspondence between ethics and life, since value is some-
thing inscribed in the very entrails of the living being. ‘The subject extracts the imma-
nent values of life from the rules. There is no separation between life and value be-
cause life itself is value. However, while life is an inconsistent position of value, the
ethical subject consciously formulates his values’. And it is in this space/derivation of
‘responsibility’ where Foucault’s problematisation is located in regards to the subject’s
relationship with the truth (founding axis of modernity) and to the subject in relation
to life (emerging axis specifically described in  Life: Experience and Science). Thus, in
addition to providing us with some renovated coordinates of thought and action (that
is, both a final observation as well as the trail of its own trajectory), Foucault immu-
nises us from the limited and simplistic interpretation of the ethical as an aesthetic of
existence that is so often referred to and that merely serves to weaken and impoverish.
What it refers to, in fact, is a return to the distorted uniqueness of heterotopy. The
proposal is simple and risky at the same time: to rethink life.
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Conclusions
Giorgio Agamben, in a short paper titled An absolute immanence (1999), has pointed
out that both Foucault’s (1985/2003) and Deleuze’s (2005) final texts are dedicated to
life. And this is not a mere coincidence; on the contrary it is the legacy of a way of
thinking that is announcing the form of the philosophy and social  thought in our
present. As we have mentioned, all the current concerns about biomedicine, biosecu-
rity, biotechnology and so on are only signals of this prevalence of Life in our present
day. A very well-known example is the recent debate regarding the issue of post-hu-
manism (Braidotti, 2006, 2014; Sloterdijk, 2009/2014). Referring to this idea, Peter Slo-
terdijk (2009/2014) insists that this millennia-long incubator no longer produces  hu-
mans since the current coordinates by which beings are deployed have been provided
by mass media,  pharmaceuticals  and biotechnology (opening an interesting line of
thought with regard to the possibility of modern technology intervening in the future
development of the species, understood as non-subjective biotechnological derivation,
currently in a decisive moment in terms of the politics of species). That is, post-hu-
manism as a response/alternative to a world where it is ever more difficult to distin-
guish between the natural and the artificial (if such a distinction is even necessary)
and in which the writing/reading axis that humanist culture creates has lost impor-
tance due to the emergence of new means of communication and expression; in which
a xenolatric attitude returns and the need for the development of ecological thought is
suggested in the widest possible sense, considering both the technological as well as
the natural environment. Obviously, these considerations are interesting. Neverthe-
less, the vitalism in Foucault’s work puts forward three interesting points in order to
rethink life and our present.
First,  vitalism doesn’t mean vindicating a kind of mysterious power animating
human or animal life. That is, it is not a zoé, the other side of bios, which goes through
every living being and is able to connect us in big arrangements. On the contrary, life
is unthinkable without a reflection about knowledge, power and subjectivation. Life,
in erring, is able to produce these three elements. Second, in this sense, the distinction
between bios and  zoé (popularized by Agamben) or even between those notions and
tekhne is insufficient and simplistic. Life is more than a qualification, more than a se-
cret animal power or more than a seamless web with technology. It is a constituent
process, a permanent exercise of redefining limits, but it is always incorporated with
assemblages of knowledge, power and subjectivation. That is, life is always a regime of
vitality in that we find truths, power relations and definitions of ourselves. Recently,
in a similar line of thought, Ayo Wahlberg and Nikolas Rose (2015) suggested the no-
tion of ‘governmentalization of living’ in order to analyse the structures that try to
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calculate, track and visualise the mentioned erring of life. This opens an interesting
line of research for Social Sciences focused on the analyses of the different forms and
mechanisms constituted in order to manage the secure, foreseen and expected trans-
formation of limits due to the assemblages of knowledge, power and subjectivations
created by life. Third, Foucault’s work never defined life by a positive or affirmative
component, as is the case of classics like Nietzsche and Deleuze or the contemporane-
ous Rosi Braidotti or Karen Barad. Rather, vitalism in the first author is simultane-
ously transcendental, that is, it is pointing to a limit broken by the constituent action
of life (similar to the proposals of Kant or Heidegger). In this sense, it is not strange
that Deleuze linked Foucault’s vitalism with the relevance that death as a limit has in
his works; and even Foucault himself dismissed classical vitalism arguing that it was a
naive and simplistic way of understanding the relation between life and death: stabil-
ising both terms as the two permanents rivals in a battle. In Foucault’s vitalism, life is
closely entwined with death; one gives form to the other and both are entangled in an
agonistic dance. Finally, it is worth noting that this kind of simultaneously positive
and negative conceptualization of life is not the legacy of authors such as Nietzsche,
Heidegger  or  Deleuze  but  rather  the  remnants  of  Canguilhem.  And,  as  Agamben
(1999) has defended, these are the real clues for understanding how vitalism will be-
come a future philosophy.
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